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OF HAWKS AND DOVES
Mapping Policies toward Iran and North Korea
Michal Onderco and Wolfgang Wagner
The policies toward countries aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons continue to be heavily
contested, differing even among countries that consider nuclear proliferation as one of the main
threats to international security. This article maps the actual policies of liberal democracies
toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum from confrontation to accommodation. Using
data from an expert survey, the authors outline four main findings. First, policies toward both Iran
and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time. Second, no policy
convergence was observed among the states studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of
joint sanctions, differences remained between states preferring confrontation and those opting for
accommodation. Third, states maintained remarkably stable policy profiles over time. Finally,
despite obvious differences between the norm violations of North Korea and Iran, states generally
followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries. The authors’ findings indicate that
states exhibit stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation toward nuclear
aspirants. Although a comprehensive examination of the causes of these policy differences is
beyond the scope of this article, the authors present evidence that a major cleavage exists
between members and non-members of the Non-Aligned Movement, indicating that the degree to
which nuclear aspirants’ sovereignty should be respected is a main issue of contention.
KEYWORDS: North Korea; Iran; treaty compliance; nonproliferation; Non-Aligned Movement;
nuclear weapons
Whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime succeeds in limiting the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional states depends to a considerable extent on the strategic interaction
between the international community and ‘‘nuclear aspirants’’*states like Iran and North
Korea, who violated the norms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), indicating both a capability and an interest in developing nuclear weapons.
The decision of North Korea about whether to acquire nuclear weapons or to abandon
its respective programs depends at least in part on the policies of the international
community. However, what the appropriate policy response to nuclear aspirants should
be has been heavily contested, even among liberal democracies that generally share the
perception of nuclear proliferation as one of the foremost threats to international security.
As students of the security dilemma have pointed out, interpreting other states’ intentions
is already a demanding challenge, but even if the ‘‘dilemma of interpretation’’ is resolved,
a ‘‘dilemma of response’’ remains.1 In general, states can opt for either a confrontational
or an accommodationist policy in response to a threat posed by another state.
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The confrontational strategy is based on the idea that threats can and should be deterred.
A state’s undesired actions, such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons, should be made
as costly as possible because the higher the costs, the more likely a cost-benefit-
calculating actor will back down. Sanctions serve the dual purpose of making undesired
actions costly and signaling a resolve to not tolerate any further provocations.
In contrast, an accommodationist strategy starts from the notion that the security
dilemma exists for both parties in a confrontation. As a consequence, the ‘‘opponent’’
state’s policies are seen primarily as reactions to the other state’s policies under conditions
of uncertainty and possibly driven by fears about its own survival. Instead of simply
assuming that one’s own actions have to be acknowledged as defensive by the opponent,
an accommodationist strategy accepts that one’s own actions can be interpreted as
offensive. In this case, the opponent’s policies may result from the mistaken interpretation
that it needs enhanced efforts to guarantee its security in the face of a growing threat. An
accommodationist policy then aims at de-escalating the conflict by signaling reassurance
to the opponent. Addressing an opponent state’s security concerns (e.g., by guaranteeing
nonaggression) thus lies at the heart of an accommodationist policy. In addition, economic
incentives may be used to exchange economic gains from trade or technology transfer for
political concessions. In contrast to sanctions, economic incentives can lead beneficiaries
in the target state to ally with the sender state and thus encourage cooperation.2
The debate about an appropriate policy response to Iran and North Korea clearly
illustrates the different rationales. A confrontational strategy assumes that sanctions, or
even the threat of possible military action, can make the development of nuclear weapons
too costly for either state to merit further investments into the program. This approach
was exemplified by President George W. Bush, who not only revived the stigmatizing label
of ‘‘rogue state’’ for Iran and North Korea, but also placed both states on an ‘‘axis of evil.’’
According to Bush, ‘‘the Iranians need to feel the pressure from the world that any nuclear
weapons program will be uniformly condemned.’’3 In contrast, an accommodationist
strategy points to the precarious security situations of both Iran and North Korea. Iran has
faced a hostile neighborhood for a long time, while Russian and Chinese support for North
Korea decreased with the end of the Cold War. From an accommodationist perspective,
the US-led intervention in Iraq can be understood as a reason for Tehran or Pyongyang
to acquire nuclear weapons because the invasion signaled the resolve to topple the
regime of any ‘‘rogue state’’ that the US president considers part of an ‘‘axis of evil.’’
An accommodationist strategy would therefore aim at reassuring Iran and North Korea of
the accommodating state’s non-aggressive intentions, thereby removing the reason to
acquire nuclear weapons. Instead of sticks (such as sanctions), carrots are the main policy
instruments of any accommodationist strategy. This approach is exemplified by the
European Union’s 2003 strategy against WMD proliferation, which holds that the ‘‘best
solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel
they need them.’’4 With a view to Iran, Gerhard Schröder, then chancellor of Germany, told
the Munich Security Conference that ‘‘Iran will only abandon its nuclear ambitions for
good if not only its economic but also its legitimate security interests are safeguarded.’’5
Neither strategy is guaranteed to succeed, or to fail. As international relations
scholar Robert Jervis has pointed out, an accommodationist policy can successfully






































prevent a situation from spiraling into conflict if the target state is prepared to de-escalate
in response to reassuring and conciliatory moves.6 However, if the target state is
committed to pursuing its course (e.g., acquiring nuclear weapons), then an accommoda-
tionist policy will be understood as a sign of weakness and further encourage the target
state.
In a similar vein, theorist James Davis has argued that promises, in contrast to
threats, may even increase the demands of the target state if it is driven by a sense of
strategic opportunity. However, states who are ‘‘motivated to challenge the status quo by
fear of losses and a sense of strategic vulnerability are best influenced through the use of
assurances and promised rewards.’’7
In his analysis of economic coercion, political scientist Daniel Drezner found that it is
the target state’s expectation of future conflict that influences the success of inducements
or sanctions. In 1994, North Korea expected future conflict with the United States, making
concessions unacceptable. According to Drezner, North Korea would only give up its
nuclear program in exchange for a substantial carrot (the delivery of nuclear reactors and
heavy oil worth $5 billion)*but not in response to economic sanctions.8
Even though scholars may disagree over the specifics of a target state’s motivation
(that is, whether it seeks opportunity or expects future conflict), research on sanctions and
economic coercion suggests that the success or failure of either accommodation or
confrontation depends mostly on these motivations. However, as students of the security
dilemma remind us, the true motivation of any government is difficult if not impossible to
establish; this creates the dilemma of interpretation that lies at the heart of the security
dilemma. Examples of misinterpretations abound. Proponents of confrontational strategy
sometimes point to one of the most prominent cases of failed accommodation: the
appeasement of Nazi Germany, which resulted from a misinterpretation of the motives
driving Hitler and his cronies. By the same token, advocates of an accommodationist policy
have pointed out that US policy toward Iran may have been self-fulfilling, in that it may
have created the very threat it was designed to deter.9
Given the difficulties of discovering a government’s true motivation, it may not be
surprising that liberal democracies have quarreled over the appropriate course of action
regarding the apparent nuclear aspirations of Tehran and Pyongyang. The aim of this
article is not to discuss the merits and shortcomings of either confrontational or
accommodationist strategies. Instead, we are interested in mapping the actual policies
of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum that stretches from
confrontation on one end to accommodation on the other. In so doing, we hope to
contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the strategic interactions between
nuclear aspirants and the international community, which we consider a crucial element in
the success or failure of nonproliferation. Systematic comparative studies have advanced
our understanding of the forces driving potential nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear
weapons (or to refrain from doing so).10 However, the confrontational or accommoda-
tionist policies formed in response to nuclear aspirants remain understudied.
The lack of comparative quantitative studies of foreign policies toward ‘‘nuclear
aspirants’’ such as Iran and North Korea is partly due to the difficulties in measuring
degrees of confrontation or accommodation.11 Although states’ particular policies may be






































obvious to educated observers, they often do not translate into observable (and thus
measurable) indicators that could form the basis for a systematic analysis. The main reason
for this is that states act strategically toward nuclear aspirants: whether they prefer
accommodation or confrontation, states generally benefit from a common, unified
position toward aspiring nuclear powers; such unity improves states’ bargaining position.
States crafting policy regarding nuclear aspirants therefore have incentives to find
compromises and keep their differences quiet. This is reflected in states’ voting behavior
on the UN Security Council or on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of
Governors: resolutions condemning nuclear aspirants’ noncompliance or even imposing
sanctions are usually carried by large majorities that result from sometimes lengthy and
cumbersome negotiations.12
These large majorities, however, do not reflect the differences in policy preferences.
As a consequence, roll-call data are of little use in identifying different degrees of
accommodation or confrontation.13 In addition, voting on the IAEA Board of Governors is
often done by the raising of hands, individual votes are not officially recorded, and only
aggregated data are published officially. With the help of an expert survey, this article aims
to redress this problem by mapping the policy preferences of thirty-five democracies
toward Iran from 2002 to 2009 and of twenty-two democracies toward North Korea from
1993 to 2009.
An expert survey offers a promising avenue on which to explore state policies
toward Iran and North Korea; it creates the possibility of a reliable, valid assessment of
various states’ preferences in contemporary international disputes that can be compared
cross-sectionally with temporal variation. The next section will give a brief overview of the
previous uses of expert surveys in political science. We then introduce our own survey and
discuss some of its methodological aspects related to sampling, data collection, and
survey design, as well as its reliability and validity. Our survey yielded four main findings
that we then discuss in turn. First, policies toward Iran and North Korea have become
increasingly confrontational over time. Second, there has been no policy convergence
among the states we studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions,
states continued to differ regarding their preferences for confrontation or accommoda-
tion. Third, countries maintained remarkably stable policy profiles, remaining either more
(or less) confrontational in comparison to other states at a given time. Fourth, despite
differences between the norm violations committed by North Korea and those by Iran,
states in general followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries at any point in
time. All in all, our findings indicate that countries have remarkably stable preferences for
either confrontation or accommodation.
Use of Expert Surveys
Expert surveys have been generally acknowledged as an inexpensive, relatively easy-to-
administer way to gather highly relevant data on topical issues.14 Another advantage of an
expert survey is that it does not require a specific data source (such as UN and IAEA voting






































records, as used in the example above) and is available for all cases for which experts
are available, which is not necessarily the case with other data.15
Most expert surveys have come from the field of comparative politics, in which
expert surveys have been extensively used as a means to establish party positions on
specific issues (most often, European integration).16 However, expert surveys have also
been used in other fields of political science, including comparative foreign policy: political
scientist Eoin O’Malley used expert surveys to measure the power of 139 prime ministers in
twenty-two parliamentary democracies over twenty years.17 In the study, O’Malley looked
at the influence prime ministers exercised over the policy output of their governments and
their ability to ‘‘get their ‘preferred policies enacted.’’’18 Furthermore, expert surveys were
used to study the outcomes of particular crises for national governments.19 International
relations scholars Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow solicited thirty-four expert assessments
of thirty-three crises over twenty-five years, asking experts what impact a particular crisis
had on an actor’s national interests (on a scale from significantly advanced to significantly
hindered) and what impact the decision had on the level of international conflict and
tension (ranging from ‘‘increased significantly’’ to ‘‘decreased significantly’’). The expert
surveys have also been used by researchers to establish perceptions of democracy on the
national level as well as on regional levels.20
One of the main advantages of expert surveys is that they are designed by the
researcher deductively and thus allow for the creation of constructs according to his or her
requirements. Therefore, an expert survey can ask a direct question without much further
input from the researcher. Expert surveys also allow researchers to make sense of a
multitude of sometimes contradictory documents and statements. The added value of an
expert is that he or she is able to make a sensible evaluation based on his or her
experience and to see a general policy profile that can become muddled in the jungle of
different sources. Additionally, experts are knowledgeable about their subject and can
make judgments based on already-existing data, documents, and publications*thus a
researcher’s need to engage with and interpret these data decreases.
In Table 1 we present a noncomprehensive overview of some of the expert surveys
undertaken in comparative politics and international relations. The list represents the
recent main trends and applications of the expert survey technique and demon-
strates that establishing common standards for an expert survey is difficult, if one is to
take the previous research as a yardstick. All of the listed expert surveys used more
than three experts per case, though using six to ten experts per case seems to be an
accepted standard. Similarly, although some scholars remain reluctant to ask experts
about past events or use multiple time points, such queries have been successfully
conducted.21
Survey Design
Our expert survey aims to map the policies of democratic countries toward Iran and North
Korea.22 Because policies were easiest to observe during times of crisis, we focused on
times when the international community was confronted with a challenge to the
nonproliferation regime either because norm violations had been detected or because






































obligations under the regime had been questioned.23 Thus, policies toward North Korea
were measured for 1993, 2003, 2006, and 2009. In 1993, North Korea announced for
the first time that it intended to withdraw from the NPT; in 2003, it finally withdrew
from the treaty. In 2006 it conducted its first nuclear test; in 2009 it conducted a second*
both tests were accompanied by the test-firing of long-range missiles. Policies toward
Iran were measured for 2002, when its nuclear program was revealed; 2006, when the
IAEA published its report on Iran’s NPT implementation, concluding that Iran had stepped
up its enrichment efforts; and 2009, when secret nuclear facilities near Qom were
uncovered.24
TABLE 1
The use of expert surveys in political science.
Sources: John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, ‘‘Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42
Societies,’’ Party Politics 1 (1995), pp. 73111; L. Ray, ‘‘Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration:
Results from an Expert Survey,’’ European Journal of Political Research 36 (1999), pp. 283306; Mark Schafer and
Scott Crichlow, ‘‘The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Quantitative Study
Building on Groupthink,’’ International Studies Quarterly 46 (2002), pp. 4568; Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver,
Party Policy in Modern Democracies (London: Routledge, 2006); Thomas König and Simon Hug, Policy-Making
Processes and the European Constitution: A Comparative Study of Member States and Accession Countries
(London: Routledge), 2006; Eoin O’Malley, ‘‘The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey,’’
International Political Science Review 28 (2007), pp. 727; Carlos Gervasoni, ‘‘Measuring Democracy through
Expert Judgments: Lessons from Argentina’s Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics,’’ paper for American Political
Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, September 25, 2010; Liesbet Hooghe et al., ‘‘Reliability
and Validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys on Party Positioning,’’ European Journal of Political
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34 ~62% 33 various 
Benoit and
Laver, 2006
5,947 28% 47 countries; 
387 parties 
1 21 (median) 
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We divided the survey into two sections, based on the two nuclear aspirants under
study: Iran and North Korea. In each section, we asked the expert to evaluate the actual
policies (not policy preferences) of six countries toward a given nuclear aspirant at each of
the time points, from ‘‘very accommodationist’’ to ‘‘very confrontational’’ (on a 7-point
semantic differential scale).25 Mitigating the effects of the positive bias to select positive
values, all options had been numbered with positive values (that is, the scale ranged from
1 to 7).26 We provided the experts with definitions of both confrontational behavior
(making strong and far-ranging demands, pressing for hard solutions such as sanctions,
and threatening or using military force) and accommodationist behavior (preferring
compromise, expressing empathy, and seeking dialogue).
The six countries comprised the expert’s own country, three other countries
in the region, the United States, and Japan.27 Including the United States and Japan
in all of the surveys allowed us to study the impact of large numbers of respondents on
the reliability of the data. We encouraged the experts to not answer ques-
tions on countries they did not feel knowledgeable about. Many experts used this
opportunity.
Some have argued that questions concerning past policies engender memory
problems that could lead to less reliable answers.28 However, such research in comparative
politics has been done: Schafer and Crichlow asked their experts to consider crises
outcomes of twenty-five years earlier; O’Malley also asked experts about distant events.29
In all cases, checks proved that the data were reliable and valid, so it seems reasonable
to expect that experts, as opposed to ‘‘lay participants’’ in censuses or general surveys,
tend to have reliable memories. Indeed, our data also show that there is no uniform
or dramatic pattern of decreasing reliability of data with increasing time difference.30
Our data thus show that with expert surveys, one can examine historical events without
compromising the reliability of the data. In total, we asked 451 experts from forty-
seven countries to complete the survey. These experts were researchers at universities or
think tanks who study nuclear nonproliferation, or international security more broadly,
though in the case of a few small countries we also asked foreign policy analysts. Having
received 173 responses that had at least one valid answer, our response rate reached
38.36 percent.
Evaluating Data Reliability
Compared with the policy positions of political parties, states’ security policies are more
elusive because states prefer to retain maximum room for maneuver. Elections provide
political parties with strong incentives to stand out with clearly defined positions in order
to attract voters. In contrast, diplomats by and large aim at remaining flexible on issues of
international security. We therefore expect higher degrees of disagreement among our
experts than among experts on political parties.
Indeed, standard deviations in our data are slightly higher than, for example, in
Leonard Ray’s data on party orientations.31 We follow Ray in identifying those expert
judgments that deviate excessively from the mean as ‘‘suspect.’’32 We then exclude them






































from our sample and further exclude all time-points with fewer than three observations. If
more than two time-points were eliminated from a particular country year, we also
excluded the country from the analysis.
Findings and Trends
Our expert survey contributes to the study of nonproliferation by answering four main
questions. First, how have policy responses toward Iran and North Korea developed over
time*have countries become more (or less) confrontational or accommodationist in their
policies? Second, has there been any convergence of policies among the countries under
study; that is, have differences over the appropriate degree of confrontation or
accommodation narrowed over time? Third (related to the previous), have there been
any country-specific policy profiles; that is, do some countries generally prefer a more
confrontational stance toward nuclear aspirants, while others generally opt for a more
accommodationist policy? (If this is the case, which countries are most confrontational or
accommodationist, in general?) Finally, have there been any differences in how
democracies reacted to the challenges posed by Iran, on the one hand, and North Korea
on the other hand?
Figure 1 depicts the overall trends in policies toward Iran and North Korea. In the
figure’s box plots, the thick lines represent the median, and the gray boxes represent the
middle 50 percent of the data, with the second quartile above the mean and the third
FIGURE 1
Development of policies toward Iran and North Korea over time.
Note: Along the Y-axis, 1 denotes the most accommodationist position and 7 the most confrontational.






































quartile below the mean.33 ‘‘Whiskers’’*the long vertical lines*represent the spread of
data up to one-and-half-times of the interquartile range (the difference between the first
and third quartiles). The dots above (or below) represent outliers within the data.
States moved toward a more confrontational position on Iran across time, even
though the difference between overall policy responses in 2006 was only slightly more
confrontational than in 2002. On the other hand, we observe a sizeable shift toward more
confrontational policies in 2009. Two countries are also notable outliers, pursuing much
more confrontational policy toward Iran compared to others: Israel (in all three years) and
the United States (in 2002 and 2006) were strongly more confrontational compared with
the rest of the sample. We will return to these two countries later.
In the case of North Korea, we observe a similar overall shift toward a more
confrontational policy, but the shift is much more gradual and incremental. We observe
only one outlier on the confrontational side: the United States in 2003, when North Korea
withdrew from the NPT. There is also one outlier on the accommodationist side: Mongolia
in 2003 and 2009.
We can thus conclude that the dynamics of policy change in the case of Iran were
much stronger and more rapid when compared with the policy response to North Korea.
Toward a Policy Convergence?
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of the policy positions toward Iran
and North Korea for each time point. For the sake of comparison, we also include the
medians and interquartile ranges.
Both standard deviations and interquartile ranges indicate that democracies have
followed quite divergent policies toward Iran and North Korea. At any crisis period, both
proponents of an accommodationist policy and those of a confrontational one had
considerable numbers of followers.
Moreover, we observe a clear lack of convergence among states over time: there is
no discernible trend of decreasing standard deviations or interquartile ranges. In the case
TABLE 2
Mean policy positions toward Iran and North Korea over time.
Mean Standard deviation Median Interquartile range
Iran, 2002 3.64 0.84 3.57 1.00 
Iran, 2006 3.94 0.88 3.75 1.07 
Iran, 2009 4.37 0.78 4.48 0.92 
North Korea, 1993 3.95 0.86 4.00 1.07 
North Korea, 2003 4.34 1.03 4.50 1.05 
North Korea, 2006 4.50 1.07 4.53 1.66 
North Korea, 2009 4.70 1.00 4.75 1.15 






































of Iran, there has been almost no convergence between 2002 and 2006 (in fact, the
pattern is one of divergence) and only limited convergence between 2006 and 2009. In the
case of North Korea, there was a pattern of divergence between 1993 and 2003 that barely
changed thereafter. Thus, although liberal democracies share common values*and, on a
general level, the perception that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat
to international security*they have remained in considerable disagreement over the
appropriate policy response to nuclear aspirants whenever a new violation of NPT
obligations was detected.34 What is more, even though democracies voted en bloc in the
IAEA Board of Governors to request cooperation*ordering special inspections, referring
Iran and North Korea to the UN Security Council, and imposing sanctions on Iran and
North Korea via the Security Council*the underlying dispute about the appropriate
policy remains. Even intense interactions among the members of NATO and of the EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy over a period of more than fifteen years have not
narrowed differences over how to address the challenges posed by Iran and North Korea.35
We will now further explore the characteristic policy profiles across individual states.
Country-Specific Policy Profiles
The results of the survey demonstrate states’ remarkably stable policy profiles over time.36
Although countries of course become more confrontational or accommodationist in
response to the nuclear aspirant’s behavior, many democracies keep a distinct policy profile,
in that they remain more (or less) confrontational in comparison with other democracies.
Figures 2 and 3 represent the policy positions over time of selected countries
toward Iran (Figure 2) and North Korea (Figure 3).37 Country-specific policy profiles (lines
that keep a characteristic distance to the others and rarely cross other lines) are especially
discernible in the case of Iran: for example, the United States and the United Kingdom
FIGURE 2
Policy positions of selected countries toward Iran.
Note: Along the Y-axis, 1 denotes the most accommodationist position and 7 the most confrontational.






































were always more confrontational than all other countries. On the other end of the
spectrum, South Africa was always more accommodationist than all the other countries,
except for Australia in 2009.
Of course, some countries have changed their policies in comparison with other
states. As Figure 2 demonstrates, France adopted a position of neither conciliation nor
confrontation at the beginning of the dispute and then clearly moved toward the
most confrontational countries by 2009. Similarly, India moved from one of the most
accommodationist countries toward more confrontation. Figure 3 also demonstrates that
France and Germany moved closer toward the confrontational policy of the United States
and the United Kingdom on North Korea as of 2006. Notwithstanding such policy changes,
however, the continuity of policies in comparison with other states remains remarkably
stable. Thus, on North Korea, the policy of the United States has been among
the most confrontational ever since Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT. In contrast,
Australia has always been more accommodationist than the other countries we selected.
In the same vein, it is also interesting to note that (although they are not included in Figure 3)
the policies of Estonia, Switzerland, Mongolia, Japan, and the Netherlands remained
almost unchanged since 2003. All in all, we observe far fewer policy-position changes in the
case of North Korea compared with developments in Iran*an intriguing phenomenon.
Do Nuclear Aspirants Face the Same Policy Response?
Finally, we use our data to assess whether Iran and North Korea have been treated in the
same way; that is, whether they faced a similar degree of confrontation or accommodation
FIGURE 3
Policy positions of selected countries toward North Korea.
Note: Along the Y-axis, 1 denotes the most accommodationist position and 7 the most confrontational.






































in response to their violations of nonproliferation norms. Of course, any such comparison
is made difficult by the fact that Iran and North Korea violated nonproliferation norms in
different ways: whereas Iran’s nonproliferation violations are suspected to serve the
maintenance of a secret weapons program (which Iran denies), North Korea withdrew
from the NPT and carried out nuclear tests. Different as these behaviors may be, they both
raise the question of whether norm-breakers are best addressed by confrontational or
accommodationist strategies.38 Because states have exhibited specific policy profiles
toward individual nuclear aspirants over time, we may also expect similar policies toward
both Iran and North Korea.
In order to see whether countries indeed treat nuclear aspirants differently or
whether they prefer accommodationist or confrontational policies in general, we
correlated our data on Iran and North Korea at individual time points. We found strong,
positive, and significant correlations between policies toward both Iran and North Korea
in 2002/2003, in 2006, and in 2009.39 This indicates that at all points in time when Iran
and North Korea can be compared, policies toward nuclear aspirants were driven by
general considerations about how to respond to violations of NPT norms, independent
of the nuclear aspirant under consideration. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the relation-
ships between policies toward Iran, on the one hand, and North Korea on the other.40
Countries positioned on the straight line across the graph prefer exactly the same
degree of confrontation or accommodation toward Iran and North Korea. Countries above
FIGURE 4
Policies toward Iran and North Korea, 2002/2003.







































Policies toward Iran and North Korea, 2006.
FIGURE 6
Policies toward Iran and North Korea, 2009.






































the line were more confrontational toward North Korea than Iran, while countries below
the line were more confrontational toward Iran.
The graphs demonstrate that, although few states prefer an identical degree of
confrontation or accommodation toward the two nuclear aspirant states, many states
prefer remarkably similar policies. In other words, states tend to prefer either confrontation
or accommodation in general, rather than confronting one nuclear aspirant while
accommodating the other. Obvious exceptions include Israel, which advocates a
maximum degree of confrontation toward Iran but not North Korea, and Mongolia, which
was consistently more confrontational toward Iran when compared with North Korea,
although not to the same extent as Israel.
The graphs also demonstrate that most countries’ policies toward North Korea have
been more confrontational than their policies toward Iran (with Israel and Mongolia as the
exceptions). These differences correspond with the fact that North Korea’s actual nuclear
tests posed a larger and more concrete threat to nonproliferation than Iran’s more nascent
and ambiguous nuclear program.
A few countries exhibited comparable patterns in their policy positions toward Iran
and North Korea. The United States was always the most confrontational, while Australia
was always among the least confrontational. The Netherlands’ policy was remarkably
stable over time, though its policy toward Iran shifted markedly between 2006 and 2009.
Ireland followed a similar policy profile; it had a moderately accommodationist policy at
the outset, followed by even more accommodationist shift, followed by a return to a
moderately accommodationist policy. Switzerland followed a similar path; initially it
moved toward a more confrontational policy, then its policy barely changed in subsequent
periods. French policy, on the other hand, has consistently grown more confrontational
toward Iran; with respect to its North Korea policy, the only pronounced shift was in 2006,
toward more confrontation.
Looking back at Figure 1 and Table 2, we see that over time states have not come to
any convergence of policy on the two ‘‘nuclear aspirants.’’ On the contrary, the standard
deviations increase, suggesting that there was more divergence in states’ policies toward
both Iran and North Korea.
Exploring Cleavages among States
Although it is well beyond the scope of this article to explore the drivers of different states’
policies, we nevertheless set out to explore one of the explanations frequently leveled,
especially with a view to the Iranian nuclear program.41 According to both policy insiders
as well as academic accounts, a major cleavage within the IAEA Board of Governors runs
along a North-South line, i.e., between countries that argue for a more interventionist form
of global governance and others that maintain a restrictive interpretation of sovereignty
and non-intervention.42 Since the Cold War era, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has
been a prominent voice of the latter*that is, the ‘‘global South.’’ We therefore explored
whether this cleavage is present within our data. (Because there were no NAM members in






































the sample of countries of whose policy toward North Korea we studied, only Iran is
examined regarding this question.)
We conducted a simple, repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
a single between-subject factor. The repeated measures represent multiple observations
of the policy toward Iran (the three points in time mentioned above), and the between-
subject factor is NAM membership. We observe a significant effect of NAM membership.43
This indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between NAM members and
non-members in their policy toward Iran. Subsequent Bonferroni-corrected contrasts
reveal that NAM non-members were 0.8 points more confrontational toward Iran
compared with NAM members (p0.034).
Although the repeated-measures ANOVA does not fully explain the difference, our
results confirm that the NAM members do indeed have a more accommodationist policy
toward nuclear aspirants in comparison to non-NAM states. Although the forces behind
policy differences need to be further explored, this finding suggests that general ideas
about the trade-off between effective nonproliferation governance, on the one hand, and
respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, on the other hand, play a
role in states’ considerations.
Conclusion
We used an expert survey to map democracies’ policies toward two nuclear aspirants, Iran
and North Korea. Based on the statements of some 170 experts, our analysis suggests four
main findings.
First, the policies of democratic states toward both Iran and North Korea have
become more confrontational over time. On average, democracies’ policies toward Iran
started out as accomodationist but turned significantly more confrontational in 2009; the
change has been more gradual vis-à-vis North Korea. Second, there has not been any
policy convergence over time among the states we studied. Given that nonproliferation
policy is high on the international agenda and that some states have made considerable
diplomatic efforts to create common policy positions toward the nuclear aspirants, it is
remarkable that the question of whether an acommodationist or confrontational policy is
more appropriate remains contested. Third, countries maintained stable policy profiles;
that is, states generally remained more (or less) confrontational in comparison to others at
all points in time. Fourth, states followed very similar policies toward both Iran and North
Korea at any point; this policy coherence is noteworthy in light of obvious differences
between the norm violations committed by the two nuclear aspirants.
Our data show that countries generally demonstrate relatively stable preferences for
either confrontation or accommodation, suggesting that states have a default policy of
either using diplomacy and positive incentives or sanctions and threats. An explorative
study of the forces driving these default policies found that there is a major cleavage
between members and non-members of the NAM. Whether democracies prefer
accommodation or confrontation thus depends on their stance toward general questions






































of respecting sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention; further research into
states’ policy choices is warranted.
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